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JCW INVESTMENTS, INC. V. NOVELTY, INC.

482 F.3D 910 (7TH CIR. 2007)

I.

INTRODUCTION

In JCW Investments, Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., JCW Investments
("JWC") filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois alleging that Novelty, Inc. ("Novelty")
infringed JCW's trademarks and copyrights.1 JCW alleged that
Novelty's line of flatulent plush dolls was confusingly similar to
and infringed JCW's copyrights and trademarks for JCW's similar
line of plush dolls.2 At trial, JCW prevailed on all claims and the
district court awarded $116,000 in lost profits resulting from the
copyright infringement, $125,000 in lost profits attributable to
trademark infringement, and $50,000 in punitive damages based
on Illinois state unfair competition law.3 The district court also
awarded JCW $575,099.82 in attorneys' fees.4 Novelty appealed
the district court's decision arguing, inter alia, that the state claim
for punitive damages under unfair competition law was preempted
by federal law, and that the district court's award of attorneys' fees
should have been capped according to JCW's contingent-fee
arrangement.'
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit clarified the scope of law that was preempted by federal
statute and affirmed the district court's decision.6
II.

BACKGROUND

"Pull My Finger Fred" is a plush doll produced by JCW that

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 921.
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appears to pass gas when his extended finger is squeezed.7 The
Fred doll depicts a white, middle-aged, overweight man with black
hair and a receding hairline that sits in an armchair, and wears a
white tank top and blue pants. 8 In addition to making a flatulent
sound, Fred also makes statements about the noises he emits,
including "did somebody step on a duck?" and "silent but
deadly."9 JCW also produced farting dolls similar to Fred under
the names Pull My Finger Frankie, Santa, Freddy Jr., Count
Fartula, and Fat Bastard.'" In 2001, JCW applied for and received
a copyright registration for Fred and, by March 2004, JCW had
sold more than 400,000 farting dolls. "
Novelty's plush doll, Fartman, like Fred, is a white, middle12
aged, overweight man with black hair and a receding hairline.
Fartman sits in an armchair and wears a white tank top and blue
pants. 3 Fartman passes gas when his extended finger is squeezed,
and he makes jokes about the sound. 14 Two of Fartman's seven
jokes are the same as two of the ten spoken by Fred. 5 In addition
to Fartman, Novelty produced farting dolls named Pull-My-Finger
Santa and Fartboy.6
JCW brought its suit against the manufacturer that produced,
marketed, and sold the Fartman line of dolls. ' The parties filed
cross motions for summary judgment and the court granted JCW's
motion finding that Novelty had infringed JCW's copyright when
it copied Fred to create Fartman. 8 The case went to trial to
determine damages for the copyright infringement, liability and
damages for trademark infringement, and related Illinois state law
claims. "
The jury found Novelty liable for trademark
7. JCW, 482 F.3d at 912.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 913.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. JCW, 482 F.3d at 913.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 913,916.
17. See id. at 913-914.
18. Id. at 914.
19. JCW, 482 F.3d at 914. On appeal, Novelty did not appear to raise the
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/8
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infringement for using the "Pull My Finger" phrase in connection
with its dolls and found that this infringement was willful and
wanton .2' This finding triggered an award of punitive damages
under Illinois unfair competition law. 2' After trial, JCW22 filed a
motion for attorneys' fees, which the court granted in full.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit dealt with federal preemption,
trademark infringement, copyright infringement, and the award of
attorneys' fees. While this summary will analyze all issues, the
focus will be on the preemption issue. Specifically, it will analyze
whether federal law preempted JCW's state law claim for unfair
competition stemming from Novelty's willful and wanton conduct.
A.

Whether JCW'S State Unfair Competition Claim Was
Preemptedby the Lanham Act

Initially, the Seventh Circuit determined that, while not
explicitly stated in statute, Illinois law allows a plaintiff to recover
punitive damages in a trademark case where the defendant acted
23
willfully.
As regards preemption, the court noted that federal law preempts
state law where (1) the federal statute explicitly provides for
preemption, (2) Congress intended to occupy the field completely,
and (3) "state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. ' 24 The
court found that the Lanham Act did not explicitly provide for
preemption and Congress did not intend to occupy the field
completely. 25 Thus, only the third option may be applicable. The
issue of federal trademark infringement, apart from its copyright and preemption
arguments. See Br. of Appellant at 17, JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., No. 052498 (7th Cir. Nov. 15, 2005), 2005 WL 3739390.
20. JCW, 482 F.3d at 914.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 917-18.
24. Id. at 918 (quoting Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64-65
(2002)).

25. Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Lanham Act provides that when a violation of any right of a
registrant has been established in a civil action, the plaintiff shall
be entitled to recover the defendant's profits, damages sustained
by the plaintiff, and the costs of the action.26 The Lanham Act
further provides that, in assessing damages, the court may enter
judgment for any sum above the amount found as actual damages
as long as such amount does not exceed three times the amount of
actual damages.27 If the court finds that the amount of recovery
based on profits is inadequate or excessive, "the court may in its
discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be
just, according to the circumstances of the case. Such sum in
either of the above circumstances shall constitute compensation
and not a penalty. ' 2' The Lanham Act thus permits compensation
but not a penalty such as punitive damages. 29 The court noted,
however, that the Lanham Act does not expressly forbid punitive
damages in a way that would preempt a state law remedy.3"
Therefore, the court found that "it [was] not clear that punitive
damages would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'"
In support of its finding, the court noted that the leading treatise
on trademark law, McCarthy on Trademark, assumes that state
damages are permitted. The court also analogized with Attrezzi,
LLC v. Maytag Corp., in which the First Circuit found that the
Lanham Act did not preempt an award of attorneys' fees under a
state cause of action.33 Thus, relying on the guiding authority of
the First Circuit and Professor McCarthy, the Seventh Circuit held
that, "to the extent that state substantive law survives and is
coterminous with federal law in this area, state law remedies

26. JCW, 482 F.3d at 918 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006)).
27. Id. (quoting § 1117(a)).
28. Id. (quoting § 1117(a) (emphasis added by the court)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (quoting Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64-65 (2002)).
32. JCW, 482 F.3d at 918-19 (quoting 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:97 (4th
ed. 2005)).
33. Id. at 919 (citing Attrezzi, LLC v. Maytag Corp., 436 F.3d 32 (1st Cir.
2006)).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/8
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should survive as well."34 The court reasoned that "the portion of
the Lanham Act indicating that the compensation under federal
law shall not constitute a 'penalty' does not . . . mean that state
laws permitting punitive damages under defined conditions are
preempted."35 The court further noted that preemption is the
exception rather than the rule in the area of trademark law.36
B. Whether the DistrictCourt'sAward of Full Attorneys' Fees
Was Proper UnderEither the Copyright Act or the Lanham Act
The Seventh Circuit noted that the Copyright Act permits an
award of attorneys' fees in the discretion of the district court.37
Similarly, under the Lanham Act, a decision to award attorneys'
fees "is firmly committed to the district court's discretion."38
Therefore, a court's discretionary award of attorneys' fees is
justified under both copyright and trademark theories.
In the present case, JCW had entered into a contingency fee
basis with its attorneys, and Novelty argued that an award of
attorneys' fees should be capped at the contingency amount. 9
Thus, if the fee agreement provided that JCW's attorneys were
entitled to one third of the total recovery, then the attorneys' fee
award should be capped at half of the total damages awarded by
the district court (thus making the attorneys' fee one third of the
total recovery).4"
The Seventh Circuit held that JCW was entitled to its full
attorneys' fees and that its contingency arrangement did not
effectively cap its potential award.41 The court distinguished the
present case from City of Burlington v. Dague, in which the
Supreme Court rejected a "contingency enhancement" where the
prevailing party sought more than the lodestar amount.42 The
34. Id. at 919.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 919-20 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006)).
38. JCW, 482 F.3d at 920 (quoting BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co.,
41 F.3d 1081, 1099 (7th Cir. 1994)).
39. Id. at 920.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 921.
42. Id. (citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Seventh Circuit reasoned that here, unlike in Dague, the prevailing
party is not seeking an award beyond the lodestar amount.43 The
court found that the weight of controlling authority explicitly held
that an award of attorneys' fees is not limited to the amount
In Blanchard v.
provided in a contingent fee arrangement.'
Bergeron, decided after Dague, the Supreme Court found that an
award of attorneys' fees was not limited to the terms of a
contingent fee arrangement in a civil rights action.45 Thus, the
Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding JCW its full attorneys' fees.46
C. Whether Defendant Infringed Plaintiff's Copyright
The Seventh Circuit noted that to establish copyright
infringement, one must prove two elements: (1) ownership of a
valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the
work that are original.47 To establish copyright protection, "some
minimal degree of creativity or the existence of intellectual
production, of thought, and conception" must be shown.48
Generally, copyright protection begins at the moment an original
work of authorship is fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.49 The owner of a copyright may obtain a certificate of
copyright, which is prima facie evidence of the validity of the
Copying the work, the second prong of the
copyright.
test,
may be inferred by showing that the defendant
infringement
had access to the original work and that the accused work is
substantially similar to the original work." If, however, the two
43. Id. at920-21.
44. JCW, 482 F.3d at 920 (citing Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)
and Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994)).
45. Id. at 920-21.
46. Id. at921.
47. Id. at 914 (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., 499 U.S.
340, 361 (1991)).
48. Id. (quoting Feist,499 U.S. at 362).
49. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006)).
50. JCW, 482 F.3d at 914-15 (quoting § 410(c)).
51. Id. at 915 (citing Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton Drake Galleries, 272
F.3d 441, 450 (7th Cir. 2001) and Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d
1167, 1169-70 (7th Cir. 1997)).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss1/8
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works are so similar as to make it highly probable that the later one
is a copy of the earlier one, the issue of access need not be
separately addressed. 12
In the present case, it was undisputed that JCW owned a valid
copyright in its Fred doll. 3 The only question was whether
Novelty copied the constituent elements of Fred that were
original. 4 The court also found that the president of Novelty had
seen Fred and may have photographed him. 5 Although the actual
designer of the Novelty doll may not have seen Fred, the designer
drew the Novelty version at the direction of the president. 6 The
Seventh Circuit applied the "corporate receipt doctrine," under
which "if the defendant is a corporation, the fact that one
employee of the corporation has possession of [the] plaintiffs
work should warrant a finding that another employee . . . had
access to [the] plaintiff's work," and found that Novelty had access
to the Fred doll.57 In addition to finding access, the court found
that there was a substantial similarity between the two dolls to
warrant an inference of copying. 8 The court concluded that no
objective person would find the dolls to be more than minimally
distinguishable and that the dolls were, therefore, substantially
similar." Indeed, the court found that Fartman and Fred were so
substantially similar that copying could be inferred even without
evidence of access.6 °
IV. CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit found that JCW's state claim for unfair
competition was not preempted by the Lanham Act, the district
court's award of attorneys' fees was appropriate, and the district
52. Id. (quoting Ty, 132 F.3d at 1170).
53. Id.
54. Id.

55. Id.
56. JCW,482 F.3d at 915.
57. Id. at 915-916 (quoting Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972
F.2d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 1992)).

58. Id. at 916.
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 926
(7th Cir. 2003)).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

7

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol.[Vol.
18, Iss.XVIII:213
1 [2016], Art. 8

220

DEPAUL J ART, TECH. & IPLAW

court's finding of copyright infringement was appropriate under
the circumstances.
Phil Carey-Bergren
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